

Number

LANCS-D4.1-SN.D

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<b>Title</b>	Summary Note (SN) for D4.1
<b>Subtitle</b>	Ethical aspects of development <b>D</b> : <i>ICT for Human Security</i>

PROBLEM	<input type="checkbox"/>	SOLUTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	Research Note	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Selected Annotation	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Categories: | | |

Summary:

The note summarises the ties between transnational development of market democracy and the perceived need for advanced surveillance technologies and mobility controls. It summarises the objectives and problematics of the *securitization* trend.

## CONTEXT

Agreements on transnational development have mobilized European societies in an unprecedented manner. Within Europe, the key objective is focused on protecting the internal market and coping with global problems of organized crime, fraud, corruption and breach of human rights. The success of the European market democracy hinges on the protection of the Four Freedoms—free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. It hinges on functional and technical integration in matters of economic and social development, security and justice.

The institutional and organizational complexity of transnational arrangements and practices demands that mobilities are monitored and checked, and information made available to surveillance agencies. Being 'open for business' means opening the doors to legitimate flows of goods, services, capital and persons as well as to the risks of illegitimate flows. Unequal distribution of wealth and welfare, social disunity and unrest, radicalised hostility toward Western democracies and corporate enterprise, have also called for greatly improved mobility controls. As a result, the question of who is a trusted traveller and who is a potential threat has taken priority. High degree of privacy may no longer be desirable and the key solution to perceived threats and dangers is to deploy advanced ICTs to trace, measure and check, with the ultimate aim to predict and prevent certain kinds of events from happening.

(Key readings include: Balzacq and Carrera, 2006; Bigo et al, 2007; Council of the European Communities, 2000; Council of the European Union, 2004, 2009; Daskala and Maghiros, 2007; De Hert, 2008; De Zwaan and Goudappel, 2006; European Commission, 2004, 2009; European Parliament, 1999; European Parliament Fact Sheets, 2000; European Union, 2010; Lodge, 2007; Robinson et al, 2009; Sutrop, 2010; Van De Garde-Perik et al, 2008.

## FACTS

The 2000s saw a drift in priorities set by the European Council. Strategies to strengthen the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice threatened to compromise the commitment to freedom, based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of

law. Europe followed a global trend towards securitization to justify the deployment of advanced ICTs under the pretence of a necessary protection of democratic freedoms, of combating terrorism and cross-border crime.

This security-led approach, has significantly increased surveillance, while it still struggles to formulate how privacy and freedoms can be protected. Judicial and law enforcement authorities are involved in aggregating and disseminating ever more personal information on both citizens and non-citizens. Many of the same surveillance and security technologies are deployed by myriad of private and corporate agencies who trace, monitor and intercept the mobilities that emerge in contemporary market democracy. Much less attention has been devoted to these 'other' areas in relation to the question of whether the new technologies can be contained and controlled. Too little attention is also devoted to promises and expectations which may not be entirely realistic, and the honesty with which the potentials and limitations of ICT systems are communicated by visionaries and leaders in the surveillance and security industries.

## COMMENT

Directives and regulation on data protection have been challenged in recent years. Questions are raised about proportionality, breach of human rights, and related issues, and the regulatory framework has been under review. There have also been challenges to public diplomacy, to the institutionalised protocols for engaging both experts and publics in debate and consultation on the uses of ICTs for human security, and involving ICT-related industries in policy development.

Transnationalization and market democracy under the economic leadership of Western nations and corporate enterprise, is met with growing hostility—a trend which has called for additional security measures while cultivating the official justification rhetoric of imminent threats and enemies of democratic freedoms. But there is still no evidence that the pivotal role given to ICTs to solve problems of unrest, crime and terrorism is justified. Rather the emphasis on ICTs has folded into the promises and perils of the securitization trend, i.e., what has become the *burden of security*. The assumptions on which 'security' already rests – our *right to security in a free democratic world* – may have to give way to questions of purpose and direction which can be meaningfully associated with:

1. **transnationalization** (labour migration, tourism, investment, transport and transnational governance, crime and terrorist prevention)
2. **the objectives of surveillance** (profiling and stereotyping using data mining and statistical social sorting, remote identity checking, behaviour screening in crowds and mundane activities, predictive modelling of future events, targeted marketing of products)
3. **(ir)responsible innovation** (industry involvement in policy development, S&T governance and the management of data and data jurisdiction; Also, the expertisation of technology assessment and public engagement)
4. **the burden of security** (coping with security operations), in particular:
  - the ubiquity of surveillance and security operations which may or may not inter-operate
  - the safety and reliability of devices, systems and practices --or a lack thereof
  - the conundrums in surveillance and security operations which ordinary people face in both occupational and private capacity.